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ABSTRACT
The events around the 2009 A/H1N1 Influenza Pandemic highlighted the need for better plan-
ning to ensure protection of those on vessels, protection for ports of call, and protection of
business assets (business continuity). The variety of stakeholders involved in the management of
a pandemic made it difficult to achieve a cohesive plan during the event itself. By considering
the actions during the last pandemic, and the literature available for the shipping industry on
pandemic planning, a pathway to better preparation is suggested.
(Int Marit Health 2011; 62, 3: 196–199)
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INTRODUCTION
On 11th June 2009 the World Health Organisa-
tion (WHO) announced the start of the 2009 influen-
za pandemic [1]. The events that followed the an-
nouncement were well recorded in the popular press.
However, for most this was simply confirmation of what
had been long awaited.
The WHO first convened an Emergency Commit-
tee, in accordance with the International Health Re-
gulations (2005), on 25th April 2009. This was swiftly
followed on 27th April by a further meeting at which
several key decisions were made:
— the level of pandemic alert was raised from Phase
3 to Phase 4 (see Table 1);
— containment of the outbreak was not feasible.
Focus should be on mitigation measures;
— the closure of international boarders was not rec-
ommended, nor was restriction on international
travel [2].
On 29th April 2011 the pandemic alert level was
raised to Phase 5.
The tourism industry in Mexico was particularly
badly affected by the publicity that announcements
attracted. Despite the WHO decision not to restrict
international travel, the United States’ Centers for
Disease Control (CDC) issued a travel health warning
for Mexico on 27th April [3]. This recommended that
travellers postpone non-essential travel to Mexico. On
28th April the European Union Health Commissioner,
Androulla Vassiliou, was reported as urging travel-
lers to avoid any non-urgent travel to North America
[4]. Cruise companies began altering itineraries, and
in some circumstances cancelling entire cruises,
from 29th April [5]. Statements and decisions were
being made with significant economic implications,
based not only on scientific evidence and the opi-
nions of experts gathered for the WHO Emergency
Committee, but also on the need for government
agencies and companies to be seen to be reacting
to the wealth of information being exchanged in the
multitude of information media.
In 1999 the WHO issued guidance for national
organisations on the importance of planning for an
influenza pandemic; they updated that guidance in
2005 and again in 2009 [6]. Also in 1999 the CDC
published preliminary guidelines for the prevention
and control of influenza-like illness on cruise ships
[7]. The UK Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA)
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issued a marine information notice in 2007 to high-
light the need for pandemic influenza preparedness
[8]. This cited UK governmental agency advice on
pandemic planning, as well as that given by the WHO.
The US Department for Homeland Security also is-
sued guidance to the Maritime sector on pandemic
preparedness in 2008 [9].
Despite the wealth of published material guiding
the shipping industry and national bodies towards
preparation for an influenza pandemic, the 2009 event
demonstrated gaps in the practical implementation of
any planning that had occurred. The cruise industry
worked closely to close these gaps with the CDC, de-
veloping protocols to manage potential cases onboard
as the pandemic evolved. This work filtered to Public
Health groups in the rest of the world as the pande-
mic spread, and similar gaps were identified.
The world moved into the post-pandemic phase
on 10th August 2010 following an announcement by
the WHO Director-General [10]. In the preceding 14
months more than 214 countries and overseas terri-
tories had reported cases of A/H1N1 influenza [11].
The United Nations recognise 196 Members, although
up to 50 additional territories and colonies exist, some
of which reported data for A/H1N1 surveillance [12].
Over 18 400 deaths worldwide were attributed to A/
/H1N1 influenza, with a case fatality rate (CFR) of
0.04%. It is impossible to compare this accurately to
data for seasonal influenza due to the differences in
surveillance data collection, but the CFR for SARS in
2003 was 14–15% [11, 13, 14]. A/H1N1 2009 could
therefore be considered a “mild” illness in mortality
terms. Widespread transmission (as defined by the
WHO) was seen on every continent at some point
during the pandemic, sweeping through the Ameri-
cas, Oceania, Asia, and Europe within the first 15
weeks [11]. Although every country experienced the
effects of A/H1N1, there were variable responses to
the situation. The personal account that follows de-
scribes the variability and unpredictability of those
responses, as experienced in one geographical area.
A/H1N1 2009 INFLUENZA PANDEMIC
— A PERSONAL EXPERIENCE
The CDC worked very closely with the cruise in-
dustry in terms of both public health measures and
individual case management protocols. Ships sailing
in US waters benefitted from this collaboration with
a well understood approach to ships entering port.
Other countries had different approaches. My
experience was in the South Pacific. The ship I was
sailing on left Sydney, Australia on 18th April 2009
with an almost exclusively Australian passenger group
on a 35 day return voyage to Hawai’i. There were
4 ports of call on the islands of Hawai’i from 5th to 8th
of May (Honolulu, Lahaina, Hilo and Kona). The CDC
confirmed the first case of A/H1N1 influenza in
Hawai’i on 5th May, with no human-to-human trans-
mission on the islands. As we travelled back through
the islands of the South Pacific we encountered
a variety of responses, from simple reassurance that
we were following the guidance from the CDC, to face-
Table 1.  World Health Organisation (WHO) pandemic phase descriptions
Phase Descript ion
Phase 1 No animal influenza virus circulating among animals has been reported to cause infection in humans
Phase 2 An animal influenza virus circulating in domesticated or wild animals is known to have caused infection
in humans and is therefore considered a specific potential pandemic threat
Phase 3 An animal or human-animal influenza reassortant virus has caused sporadic cases or small clusters
of disease in people, but has not yet resulted in human-to-human transmission sufficient to sustain
community-level outbreaks
Phase 4 Human-to-human transmission of an animal or human-animal influenza reassortant virus able to sustain
community-level outbreaks has been verified
Phase 5 The same identified virus has caused sustained community-level outbreaks in two or more countries
in one WHO region
Phase 6 In addition to the criteria defined in Phase 5, the same virus has caused sustained community-level
outbreaks in at least one other country in another WHO region
Post peak Levels of pandemic influenza in most countries with adequate surveillance have dropped below
period peak  levels
Post pandemic Levels of influenza activity have returned to the levels seen for seasonal influenza in most countries
period with adequate surveillance
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to-face visual screening of all disembarking passen-
gers (looking at someone to see if they appeared ill).
Most commonly passengers were asked to complete
a self-declaration regarding the key symptoms of in-
fluenza, and were only allowed to disembark on to
an island if they had no suggestion of possible ill-
ness. This response was not entirely unreasonable
or unexpected. Historical records from the Influenza
Pandemic of 1918–1919 describe morbidity rates
of up 90% on some islands, and a mortality rate of
25% on others [15]. The islands have limited ability
to manage an imported illness, especially if the mor-
bidity is high. The local public health officials were
often reassured by discussing the ship’s itinerary
compared to the timeline of disease spread during
the pandemic to the areas we had visited. This was
not the situation in Australia however.
During our 35-day voyage we had 2 cases of in-
fluenza, which onboard testing had confirmed to be
Influenza A. Both cases had been cleared of isola-
tion for more than 10 days prior to the end of the
voyage. On 23rd May 2009 when we returned to Syd-
ney the ship was placed under quarantine, pending
release by the local public health authorities. The
process took nearly 8 hours. The officers who ar-
rived at the ship did not have a pre-arranged pro-
cess for managing the situation despite more than
96 hours notice of the ship’s arrival, and a decade
of guidance. The information presented regarding
the risk of our ship bringing cases of pandemic A/
/H1N1 influenza into the country, or lack of risk, was
not trusted, and therefore ignored, as was the state-
ment by the Director-General of the WHO on 27th April
that containment was not feasible.
The spectrum of approaches to managing ships
in port was seen the world over. There was little con-
gruity between the level of sophistication of a port’s
public health infrastructure and measured, evidence-
based responses to ship arrivals. In fact some of the
best collaborations seen between ships and ports
were in small communities where comprehensive
dialogue was entered into early, with both parties
understanding the approach of the other.
LESSONS LEARNT
It has already been mentioned that pandemic
planning has been identified as an important area
for strategic and procedural development for over
a decade. The events of the 2009 pandemic highlight-
ed that very few groups in the shipping industry had
actually mapped practical processes to handle such
a scenario. Stakeholders for these scenarios include
the masters of vessels (and their on-board medical
teams or executives as appropriate), shipping com-
panies, port authorities, national public health organ-
isations (such as the CDC), and international organ-
isations (such as the WHO). Each of these will have
a different emphasis on pandemic planning, but all will
have the common goals of protection of those on the
vessels, protection for the ports of call, and protec-
tion of business assets (business continuity). Review
of the processes encountered during the 2009 in-
fluenza pandemic highlighted four key deficiencies
for the shipping industry:
— lack of practical process — ship and shore, pri-
vate enterprise, and governmental agencies;
— lack of preparation for the extreme measures
encountered;
— lack of evidence-based measures;
— lack of trust between parties.
Many organisations have reviewed their practical
processes for handling this type of scenario in fu-
ture, assisted by a raft of new guidance, some of
which is industry specific, such as that by the Inter-
national Maritime Health Association [16]. There has
been a lot of work initiated by the United Nations
World Tourism Organization to review the economic
and social impact of the pandemic on various com-
munities, and planning around the mitigation of such
impacts in future. Some of this work involves revie-
wing the management of information in the media,
in the age of the Internet, as there is no doubt that
this influenced decision-making at every level. A WHO
review, following the 2009 pandemic, has reported
15 recommendations. One of these is that “the WHO
should review and assess the effectiveness and im-
pact of border measures taken during the pandem-
ic to support evidence-based guidance for future
events” [17]. Other recommendations cite the need
to base decision-making on evidence-based informa-
tion, accepting that information will evolve as the
dynamics of the pandemic become apparent.
Building trust between parties, ahead of the next
event, is possibly the most important area to address
for pandemic planning. There is a common goal for
those from all parts of the shipping industry, including
the ports they visit, to ensure the protection of all peo-
ple who are in contact with any shipping activity. With
this commonality in mind, it is crucial to strengthen
relationships to ensure all responses are mutually
agreed and appropriate to the situation. During the
2009 pandemic, where ports and their visiting ships
had good working relationships, processes ran smooth-
ly and effectively. Work has already begun around
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the world to strengthen these relationships. The Euro-
pean SHIPSAN project and Brazilian ANVISA collabo-
ration are two such examples, which aim to improve
co-operation in the passenger shipping sector.
CONCLUSIONS
The 2009 influenza pandemic reinforced the im-
portance of pandemic planning for governmental agen-
cies and private industries alike. The shipping indus-
try brings together a multitude of stakeholders from
all areas. Shipping will always be considered a signifi-
cant vector for communicable illness due to the con-
fined situation for those onboard and the large dis-
tances its vessels cover. It is also of great importance
given its pivotal role in international trade economics.
The deficiencies noted informally by the industry fol-
lowing reflection on the 2009 pandemic are echoed
in national and international reviews into all aspects
of the event. The pathway to better preparation for
the shipping industry must include improved dialogue
between all parties but especially with port health au-
thorities, as well as preparation for practical elements.
If this is achieved then management of all public
health situations, no matter how large or small, could
be handled on a continuum of response to the bene-
fit of all in safeguarding public health. This is the ulti-
mate goal of pandemic planning.
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